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The target article provokes three comments and one more
general criticism. First, the reason it is not surprising that "[the
optimality heuristic] is used most systematically and successful-
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ly in the physical sciences . . . arid least in the social sciences" is
not its increased plasticity, as is claimed. Rather, it is the greater
accuracy and wider applicability of mathematical models in the
physical sciences. As Schoemaker amply points out, the equa-
tions governing many physical dynamical systems can be viewed
through the smoky glass of optimising principles. But in the
social sciences it is rather easy to provide myriad examples to
refute a hypothesis with substantial quantitative rather than just
qualitative import. Optimality hypotheses, dealing in quan-
tities, are hard to come by because quantitative hypotheses in
general are hard to come by.
Second, equilibria and optimality bear a more complex rela-
tionship to each other than is revealed by viewing the former as
just "minimising a difference function defined on the actual and
ideal states," as suggested in the context of chemical equilibria.
For example, Maynard Smith's (1974) evolutionarily stable
strategies (ESSs), which are indeed equilibria, might often be
better viewed as suboptimal, in terms of different criteria.
A third point is that the issues the target article highlights are
slightly obscured by the absence of a distinction between the
messages that might be better directed at general explanation in
science and those that are specific to optimality principles. For
example, of the eight features of the optimality heuristic, only
the fourth, "teleological description of the system," is really
confined to optimality; all the others seem to be perfectly
general. "Confirmation bias" is also not restricted to this
heuristic.
The more general criticism can be seen clearly in a paradig-
matic environment for the optimality heuristic - cognitive
science. Humans are entities for which both teleological and
causal explanations may genuinely invoke processes of optimisa-
tion, whereas with water or exchange rates, only the teleological
explanations trade on optimisation. As seen in the target article,
optimality assumptions are rife at the "higher" cognitive levels,
for instance in postulates concerning rationality; but they have
also been made about the "lower" subpersonal levels, for exam-
ple in postulates concerning energy minimisation for constraint
satisfaction. Unfortunately, only the significance of levels of
explanation and description is ever alluded to. The claim is
made, for instance, partly in the context of economic explana-
tion, that "each optimality principle, it seems, begs for an
associated process explanation that describes causally, within
the constraints of an organism or system, how it operates."
Surely this confuses the levels.
For concreteness (rather than correctness, Foster 1990),
consider Marr's three levels (Marr 1982). At the computational
level, the task a system performs is described and possibly
justified on the grounds of appropriateness; at the algorithmic
level, representations commensurate with the task and the
algorithm by which it is carried out are defined; and at the
implementational level, the precise physical realisation of
the algorithm is described. As Fodor teaches (Fodor 1975), the
fact that psychology has an independent existence at all is a
function of the different modes of theoretical explanation at
these different levels. The target article suggests an unhap-
piness with a computational-level optimality principle unless its
algorithmic and/or implementational level are also evident.
This is unlikely to be a fruitful methodological restriction.
In this context, questions about the use of optimality should
be directed at the computational level. How felicitous is it to
suppose that human cognition is optimising some measure? The
quick-footedness Gould and Lewontin (1979) note is also evi-
dent in the discussion of planning under the assumptions of
bounded rationality, as seen in a dispute between Dennett and
Fodor (Dennett 1987; Fodor 1981). Fodor criticises Dennett for
being too wedded to predicting others' actions on the basis of
assumed rationality, meaning rationality in the narrow sense
defined in the target article. Dennett responds that rationality is
inevitably bound in terms of the time and space available for
processing, and it is therefore appropriate to predict assuming
these bounds. But this threatens to make the notion of optimisa-
tion too trivial to be of value.
In drawing our attention back to the uses and abuses of
optimality, the target article raises a number of important
hurdles that users of optimality principles should vault. Need-
less to say, cognitive science is "tripping" happily.
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